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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY  
Paid parental leave (PPL) has become an increasingly important component of family policy 
across OECD countries. Following the implementation of Australia’s statutory PPL scheme in 
2011, the United States remains the only OECD country without a national PPL program. 
Whilst a broad body of literature explores the impact of these policies on female employment, 
maternal health and child outcomes, much less is known about the impact on female fertility 
desires and intentions. PPL provides financial support and a link to the workplace following 
childbirth and so may lead women to intend to have more children than they would 
otherwise. It has been shown that fertility intentions predict fertility outcomes, and so 
understanding the link between PPL and fertility intentions important for public policy, 
particularly given the declining trend in fertility rates observed across developed countries. 
In this paper, we estimate the effect that access to any paid parental leave (whether employer 
or government funded) has on women’s fertility desires and intentions in Australia. Previous 
studies that estimate the effect of PPL access on fertility have largely examined generous 
paid leave schemes, with less known about the effects of less generous policies. Australia’s 
PPL scheme provides 18 weeks of paid leave at the full-time minimum wage, or 41% of the 
average wage. This paper therefore contributes an estimate of the impact of modest PPL 
schemes on fertility intentions. Additionally, this paper extends and complements the 
existing government-commissioned evaluation of the Australian PPL scheme. Our results 
provide timely and valuable information for current PPL discussions in the United States.   
We find that the announcement of the PPL scheme had no impact on whether women do or 
do not want any children. However, conditional on intending to have children, access to PPL 
increases the intended number of children by 0.28, a 13% increase. This effect is entirely 
driven by highly educated women with no existing children. These findings indicate that 
fertility intentions are influenced by public policy. Coupled with evidence that fertility 
intentions predict realized fertility outcomes, our results suggest that even a modest PPL 
scheme such as that implemented in Australia can increase fertility rates among working 
women, and potentially moderate the declining fertility rates observed in most developed 
countries. 
  
 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS  
Micaela Bassford is a student at the university of Sydney, where she recently completed her 
Bachelor of Economics (Honours) and is now completing a Bachelor of Laws. Email: 
mbas1698@uni.sydney.edu.au.  
Hayley Fisher is a Lecturer in the School of Economics at the University of Sydney. Her 
research focuses on the causes and consequences of family formation and dissolution, 
including the influence of family law and the strategies used to smooth the shock of 
relationship breakdown. Email: hayley.fisher@sydney.edu.au.  
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: This paper uses unit record data from the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. The HILDA Project was initiated and is funded 
by the Australian Government Department of Social Services (DSS), and is managed by the 
Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research (Melbourne Institute). The 
findings and views reported in this paper, however, are those of the authors and should not be 
attributed to either DSS or the Melbourne Institute. We thank Kadir Atalay, Garry Barrett, 
Stefanie Schurer and Marian Vidal-Fernandez for helpful comments. Fisher acknowledges the 
support of the Australian Research Council Discovery Project (DP150101718). 
 
DISCLAIMER: The content of this Working Paper does not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the Life 
Course Centre. Responsibility for any information and views expressed in this Working Paper lies entirely with the 
author(s). 
 
 
 
 
 
(ARC Centre of Excellence for Children and Families over the Life Course) 
Institute for Social Science Research, The University of Queensland (administration node) 
UQ Long Pocket Precinct, Indooroopilly, Qld 4068, Telephone: +61 7 334 67477 
Email: lcc@uq.edu.au, Web: www.lifecoursecentre.org.au 
Abstract 
Paid parental leave has become an increasingly important part of family policy in OECD 
countries: by 2004 on average over a year of leave paid at 59% of average wages was 
provided. Australia’s Paid Parental Leave (PPL) scheme was introduced in 2011 and provides 
18 weeks of leave paid at the full time minimum wage for the primary carer of a child. Prior 
to the scheme, federal and state legislation provided paid maternity leave for most state and 
federal employees. We estimate the effect of access to paid parental leave on women’s 
fertility desires and intentions by exploiting the differential impact of the scheme for women 
working in the public and private sectors. We find that the announcement of the scheme had 
no impact on fertility desires or intentions at the extensive margin but that, conditional on 
intending to have at least one (more) child, the number of children intended increases by 0.28, 
a 13% increase. This effect is driven by highly educated women who do not already have 
children. As it has been shown that fertility intentions predict fertility outcomes, these results 
suggest that even modest paid parental leave programs can increase the fertility of working 
women and so moderate the declines in fertility rates seen in many developed countries. 
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1 Introduction
Since 1970, paid parental leave policies have increased in importance in OECD countries,
growing in generosity from an average of 17 weeks in 1970 to over one year in 2014 (OECD
2015b). A broad body of research has linked these paid leave policies to increased female
employment, improved maternal health, and benefits for children (Adema and Frey 2015).
The costs of these schemes vary considerably across countries depending on leave length
and payment generosity, from as much as 0.5% of GDP in Nordic and Eastern European
countries to 0.07% in New Zealand (and 0% in the United States) (Adema and Frey 2015).
Publicly-funded paid parental leave provides a financial transfer to working women at
the birth of a child alongside job security and an improved ability to combine work with
early childcare responsibilities. This eases constraints associated with fertility choices
and so is expected to increase intended levels of fertility. Previous studies estimating the
effect of access to paid parental leave on fertility have mainly focused on countries with
generous paid leave schemes, and found modest positive effects of increased generosity,
either in terms of leave duration or payment rates. For example, Lalive and Zweimu¨ller
(2009) finds that an increase in leave duration from one to two years in Austria caused
a 15% increase in fertility, and Malkova (2014) finds that the introduction of one year
of paid maternity leave in Russia led to a 5% increase in fertility rates, driven by higher
parity births. Studies of recent German reforms that reduced the duration of paid leave
from two years to one year but linked payments to earnings and so increased the value
of the leave for higher earning mothers have found that a 1000e increase in the value of
the leave increased fertility by 1.2% (Raute 2014; Stichnoth 2014). Less is known about
the effects of less generous paid parental leave policies.
In this paper, we examine whether the provision of paid parental leave affects the
fertility desires and intentions of working women in Australia. Australia first introduced
a federal Paid Parental Leave (PPL) scheme in 2011, providing 18 weeks of paid leave
to a newborn’s primary carer paid at the full-time minimum wage, equivalent to a 41%
replacement rate at the average wage – a relatively modest scheme in an international
context. Prior to this, any paid leave was provided either through collective bargaining
agreements or at the discretion of employers. This paper therefore contributes an estimate
of the impact of a modest paid parental leave scheme on fertility intentions.1
We use data on employer-provided paid maternity leave and fertility preferences from
the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey for working
women aged 21 to 45 and estimate how the substantial expansion in paid parental leave
1Due to the recent implementation of the scheme and data availability, we are unable to estimate the
impact on realised pregnancy or fertility.
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provision induced by the scheme’s introduction affects fertility desires and intentions.
Estimating the impact of paid parental leave access on fertility intentions is compli-
cated by the fact that women are likely to choose their job based on the benefits offered:
women with stronger fertility preferences may choose jobs offering paid leave generating
a spurious positive relationship between access to paid leave and fertility intentions. We
exploit the fact that the introduction of the PPL scheme increased access to any paid
parental leave by 54 percentage points for women working in the private sector, but only
13 percentage points for women working in the public sector. This generates exogenous
variation in access to paid leave and allows us to identify the causal effect of leave access on
fertility desires and intentions. We have three measures of fertility expectations: whether
a woman would like to have a child in the future; whether a woman expects to have a
child in the future; and conditional on expecting to have at least one (more) child, how
many children the woman expects to have. This allows us to consider both the extensive
and intensive margins of fertility intentions.
We find that, on average, women with access to any paid parental leave have higher
fertility desires and expectations than women with no paid leave, but that this is explained
by whether the woman already has children: women without children have higher fertility
intentions and are also more likely to be in a job offering paid parental leave. Exploiting
the introduction of the PPL scheme, we find that having access to paid parental leave has
no significant effect on fertility desires or on the extensive margin of fertility intentions.
Our primary result is the impact of access to paid leave on the intensive margin of fertility
intentions: conditional on an intention to have children, access to paid parental leave
causes an increase in the intended number of 0.28, a 13% increase. A series of robustness
checks show that this is not driven by uncertainty about access to paid parental leave
before the scheme’s introduction, or by changes in employment status and sector induced
by the scheme’s announcement. Placebo tests show no statistically significant differences
in trends in leave access or fertility expectations between women working in the public
and private sectors before the scheme’s introduction.
We also find heterogeneity in the impact of paid leave access. The effect on the
intended number of children is entirely driven by women who are yet to have children,
and by women with above high school education.
These results demonstrate that fertility intentions are influenced by family policy.
Coupled with evidence that fertility intentions predict fertility outcomes,2 these results
2Using US data, Morgan (2001) shows that average intended parity is “...relatively stable and frequently
provides good/useful estimates of mean completed parity.” Schoen et al. (1999) shows the additional
predictive power of fertility intentions for future fertility using a different US dataset. For the UK,
Berrington (2004) shows that women’s fertility intentions are strongly predictive of completed fertility
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suggest that even modest paid parental leave programs can increase fertility among work-
ing women and so help to moderate the declines in fertility rates seen in many developed
countries, including Australia. A corollary of this is that the expected cost of such pro-
grams needs to account for these fertility responses.
These results are also relevant to current discussions about parental leave schemes
in the United States, which remains the only OECD country to provide no guaranteed
paid leave to new parents (OECD 2015b).3 A recent OECD report that advocates for the
introduction of paid parental leave in the US suggests that the costs of such a scheme are
likely to be in line with those in Australia or New Zealand (Adema and Frey 2015, p.79).
A large proportion of the current evidence of the effects of paid parental leave focuses on
the longstanding and generous schemes in place in many European countries.4 Hence, a
broader evidence base on the effects of the Australian scheme, with its recent introduction
and modest payment level, will be valuable for understanding the likely impacts of any
proposed policy in the US, such as the twelve weeks of payment currently proposed by
both Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders in the 2016 Democratic Presidential Primary
election campaign (Peck 2016).
2 The Australian Paid Parental Leave scheme
Australia’s statutory PPL scheme was announced in May 2009, and came into force on the
1st of January 2011 (Department of Social Services 2014). Whilst a national paid parental
scheme was discussed by the Australian Labor Party during the 2007 election campaign,
no details on funding, eligibility or the level of support were discussed and substantial
uncertainty remained until the government responded to the Productivity Commission’s
final report in 2009 (Maiden 2008). The scheme provides eighteen weeks of pay at the
full-time minimum wage (40.6% of average earnings (OECD 2015b)) to the primary carer
of a new child (born or adopted), which can be taken at any time within the first year
of a child’s birth or adoption (Baird and Whitehouse 2012). Prior to its implementation,
Australia was one of only two OECD countries to remain without a national PPL program
(OECD 2015b). The Australian scheme is therefore the most recently introduced national
paid leave scheme in the OECD, and is modest in comparison to the generosity of other
even after controlling for other observable characteristics.
3For example, the US Department of Labor recently launched their ‘#LeadOnLeave’ initiative which
provides grants to interested states and cities to assist in the design and evaluation of paid family leave
proposals (United States Department of Labor 2015).
4See, for example, recent studies on Norway (Dahl et al. 2013; Carneiro et al. 2015), Germany (Raute
2014; Stichnoth 2014; Bergemann and Riphahn 2015) and Austria (Lalive and Zweimu¨ller 2009; Lalive
et al. 2013).
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OECD countries’ schemes.
The stated objectives of the scheme were to normalize taking time out of paid em-
ployment for new parents and to promote gender equality and work-family life balance
(Martin et al. 2014a). The scheme replaced the ‘baby bonus’ program that provided one-
off payments to new parents following the birth of a child.5 Payments under the scheme
are funded from general taxation and paid via the employer. Although the scheme pro-
vides gender neutral ‘parental’ pay, it is only available to the primary carer of a newborn
and, due to wage differentials, is usually taken by women: in the first full year of the
scheme, 99.4% of recipients were mothers (Martin et al. 2013).6
To be eligible for the PPL scheme recipients must work at least three hundred and
thirty hours in ten of the thirteen months prior to birth or adoption with no gap larger
than eight weeks, and earn $150,000 or less in the year prior to the birth.7 Given the
generosity of these tests, the scheme is near universal among working women. In the
HILDA sample described below, we estimate that 94% of working women satisfy these
tests, with the vast majority of those ineligible due to low usual work hours. This is
therefore likely to be a lower bound to eligibility since women can adjust their work hours
in anticipation of pregnancy to meet the eligibility criteria.
Prior to the introduction of the PPL scheme there was no legislated entitlement to
paid parental leave. Around one half of Australia’s female workforce received some form
of paid maternity leave from their employer with an average duration of six to eleven
weeks (Baird et al. 2009). Public sector workers accounted for a large proportion of these
women: each State and Territory introduced legislation covering paid maternity leave
policy for employees, varying by state and territory and ranging from four to twelve
weeks of paid leave availability (Risse 2006). However, all employees (both casual and
permanent) with twelve months of continuous service had a legislated entitlement to 52
weeks of job-protected unpaid parental leave. These provisions remain in place, providing
job protection and unfair dismissal rights, and are complemented by the PPL scheme.
5For a short period the two schemes co-existed and parents eligible for both could elect between the
two (Department of Social Services 2014). For most working women the PPL scheme was more financially
advantageous and the majority of women eligible for both in the crossover period elected to receive the
PPL payments (Martin et al. 2014a).
6Recognising that up-take of the scheme was primarily by mothers, the government later added an
additional two weeks of non-transferable ‘Dad and Partner Pay’ (DAPP) component with payments
commencing in 2013.
7There are also residence and visa requirements.
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3 Related literature
There is a substantial and growing interdisciplinary literature examining how family poli-
cies including financial incentives, childcare and parental leave affect fertility intentions
and outcomes in developed countries (Gauthier 2007). These studies cover a wide variety
of policies implemented in many different countries at multiple points in time: this is
reflected in the range of conclusions reached. The novelty of this paper is that it pro-
vides further international evidence on the impact of a recently implemented policy that
is modest in scale compared to other studies of parental leave policies.
Studies of the impact of paid parental leave on fertility exploiting changes in policy
have found a modest positive impact. Longer leave entitlements (in the order of one
to two years) have been linked to increases in higher order fertility in Austria (Lalive
and Zweimu¨ller 2009) and in Russia (Malkova 2014). Recent reforms to paid leave in
Germany which shortened the length of leave whilst increasing payment generosity have
also been linked to modest increases in fertility, especially among more highly educated
women (Raute 2014; Stichnoth 2014). This demonstrates the importance of considering
the full design of the policy. Comparably, an increase in the payment rate for parental
leave in Quebec has been linked to increased fertility (Ang 2014). There is also evidence of
women delaying pregnancy to take advantage of the anticipated introduction of paid leave
schemes (Lichtman-Sadot 2014). Cross-country studies are more equivocal, suggesting no
relationship between the length or payment generosity of a country’s parental leave policy
and fertility rates (Gauthier and Hatzius 1997). Access to unpaid job-protected parental
leave has also been linked to higher fertility in the United States (Averett and Whittington
2001; Cannonier 2014).
Most relevant to this paper is an earlier attempt to evaluate the impact of paid and un-
paid parental leave on pregnancy in Australia. Risse (2006) examines employer-provided
maternity leave in 2003, before any legislated entitlement to paid leave, finding that un-
paid leave access increases pregnancy among women aged under 35. However, paid leave
is only associated with increases in pregnancy among women aged under 25. The draw-
back of this study is that it is unable to distinguish women selecting into jobs or choosing
the timing of their pregnancy based on leave availability.
At this stage, there is limited evidence of the effects of the Australian PPL scheme. An
evaluation commissioned by the Australian government examines outcomes including the
ease of administration of the scheme, employer responses and mothers’ experiences using a
range of specially collected survey data and in-depth interviews (Martin et al. 2014b). The
evaluation focused on the experience of mothers using the PPL scheme, comparing them
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to mothers who gave birth before the scheme’s introduction, finding that the PPL scheme
delayed mothers’ return to work over the six months post-birth, but increased labour force
participation a year later, especially returns to the pre-birth job. Improvements in the
health of mothers and an increase in breastfeeding duration were also found (Martin et al.
2014b). This paper extends and complements this evaluation by considering the effects of
the scheme on potentially eligible women rather than a selected sample of new mothers.
More broadly, there is a large body of work evaluating the impact of paid parental
leave on the employment behaviour of women, including the speed of return to work after
a birth and wage received. This evidence is mixed: while many studies find that access
to more generous paid leave increases female employment, speeds the return to work and
increases wages (Ruhm 1998; Rasmussen 2010; Ulker and Guven 2011; Rossin-Slater et al.
2013; Bergemann and Riphahn 2015), other studies find little effect on these outcomes
(Dahl et al. 2013). Studies that evaluate the effect on return-to-work behaviour during
the period of paid leave find instead that longer paid leave increases the amount of leave
taken and so delays the return to work (Hanel 2013; Lalive et al. 2013).
Access to more generous paid parental leave has also been linked to taking more leave
(Han et al. 2009), better child and maternal health (Ruhm 2000; Tanaka 2005; Aven-
dano et al. 2015; Broadway et al. 2015; Stearns 2015), better child educational outcomes
(Carneiro et al. 2015), and increased rates of breastfeeding (Huang and Yang 2015). On
the other hand, California’s paid leave policy has also been linked to higher unemployment
rates among young women (Das and Polachek 2015). The trend toward making dedicated
paid parental leave available to fathers has been linked to men taking more leave (Ek-
berg et al. 2013; Bartel et al. 2015), and to fathers being more involved in childcare
(Nepomnyaschy and Waldfogel 2007; Haas and Hwang 2008; Boll et al. 2014).
This paper also contributes to a literature examining the determinants of fertility de-
sires and intentions. Previous research has shown that fertility intentions are not fixed
across the life course, with age, relationship status transitions and fertility events being
important determinants (Berrington 2004; Liefbroer 2009; Morgan and Rackin 2010; Ia-
covou and Tavares 2011; Gray et al. 2013). Evidence for fertility intentions being adjusted
due to changes in employment status, occupation and education is much weaker (Hei-
land et al. 2008). In contrast, there is far less evidence of the impact of public policy on
fertility intentions: Yu et al. (2007) finds no impact of the Australian student income-
contingent loans scheme (HECS) on fertility intentions, whilst Drago et al. (2011) find
that the Australian Baby Bonus (a $3000 non-means tested maternity payment) increased
fertility intentions. This paper adds to our understanding of the determinants of fertility
intentions by demonstrating that paid parental leave has an impact on fertility intentions
beyond any effect on fertility events.
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4 Empirical strategy
To evaluate the relationship between access to paid parental leave and fertility preferences,
we first use OLS regressions, comparing fertility preferences of employed women with and
without access to paid parental leave. Specifically, we estimate:
prefit = β0 + β1leaveit + β2Xit + εit
where prefit is the relevant fertility intention, leaveit indicates whether woman i has
access to paid parental leave at time t. Xit is a vector of control variables that includes age,
education, number of children, marital status and income, all of which have been shown
to influence fertility intentions and desires (Berrington 2004; Hagewen and Morgan 2005;
Liefbroer 2009; Iacovou and Tavares 2011; Gray et al. 2013), and εit is an error term,
clustered at the individual level.
A crucial concern associated with this approach is that women may self-select into jobs
based on their fertility preferences and circumstances. For example, women with strong
fertility preferences may select into jobs that provide paid maternity leave, meaning that
any positive estimate of β1 reflects this selection. On the other hand, women who already
have children (and so have lower future fertility preferences) may select into jobs with
more family-friendly work policies, including paid maternity leave, biasing the estimate
of β1 downwards.
We therefore exploit the introduction of Australia’s PPL scheme to provide exogenous
variation in access to paid parental leave. Since the scheme applied to almost all working
women, the time series variation alone is insufficient as it may capture other changes
affecting fertility preferences at the same time. We therefore exploit the fact that the
introduction of the PPL scheme affected public and private sector workers’ access to paid
leave differently. Whilst the proportion of female private sector employees with access
to employer-funded maternity leave never exceeded 41% in the period before the PPL
scheme was implemented, 72-85% of public sector employees in Australia had access to
this employer-provided benefit over the period in question. So, the introduction of the
scheme had a much larger impact on access to paid parental leave for private sector
workers than for public sector workers. By comparing the response in intentions between
these groups, the impact of an extension in leave availability is identified.
Because the outcomes of interest are fertility intentions, they are likely to respond to
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the announcement of the PPL scheme rather than its implementation: women will take
into account the future option-value of the PPL from the point at which they become
aware of its existence; there is no reason to expect women to wait until the scheme’s
implementation date to adjust their intentions. Our measure of leave access therefore
includes current access to employer-provided paid leave and anticipated access to the
public scheme from the time of announcement in 2009 where a woman is eligible.
We implement an instrumental variables strategy using two-stage least squares. The
first stage predicts women’s access to paid parental leave using an indicator for working
in the private sector after the announcement of the scheme (prisec ∗ post), effectively
implementing a difference-in-difference estimator of the effect of the scheme on access to
paid leave:
leaveit = γ0 + γ1(prisec ∗ post) + γ2Xit + uit
Here Xit includes a set of wave indicators and an indicator for working in the private
sector, so γ1 estimates the differential effect of the PPL scheme on paid leave access
between the two sectors. Predicted probabilities of access to leave from this estimation
are then used in the second stage regression in place of observed leave access:
prefit = β0 + β1 ̂leaveit + β2Xit + εit
In this specification, β1 will provide a causal estimate of the effect of access to paid
parental leave on fertility intentions if a number of assumptions hold. First, the instrument
(being in the private sector after the scheme’s announcement or implementation) must
strongly predict access to leave. Below, we show that this is the case. Second, the
instrument must only affect fertility intentions through its effect on access to paid leave,
conditional on the regressors included in Xit. One part of satisfying this assumption is
that the first stage identifies a shift in leave access caused by the announcement of the
PPL scheme. Our approach takes women working in the private sector as our treatment
group – those women who were more affected by the scheme’s introduction – and women
working in the public sector as the control group. So, paid leave access trends between
these two groups should be similar apart from at the PPL scheme’s announcement. If
this were not the case, some of the increase in leave availability we attribute to the
scheme’s announcement may reflect differences in the growth rate of employer-provided
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paid parental leave. Moreover, any trends in fertility intentions should be comparable
across the two groups before the scheme’s announcement. Given a number of years of
data from before the scheme’s announcement, we are able to test this, and cannot reject
the assumption of common trends for either leave access or fertility intentions in the
pre-scheme period. These results are shown in section 6.4.
A further threat to this assumption is that the PPL scheme may have encouraged
women to change employment sector, in the knowledge that they would now have the
opportunity to receive paid parental leave in any job. For example, if women with strong
future fertility intentions initially select into a public sector job due to paid parental leave
availability, the announcement of the PPL scheme may have encouraged some of these
women to seek employment opportunities in the private sector, thus causing fertility
intentions to increase in the private sector due to sector switching rather than leave
availability. We include a set of industry indicators in Xit to control for this, and we
investigate this assumption further in section 6.5.
Finally, the instrument must satisfy monotonicity – it must (weakly) increase access
to leave for all women. One cause for concern could be that some employers who provided
paid maternity leave prior to the scheme’s introduction could remove this entitlement in
response to the publicly funded scheme, leaving some previously covered women (either
working few hours or earning in excess of the threshold) without paid parental leave
access. Employer surveys from before and after the scheme’s introduction find that some
employers modify their parental leave benefits in response to the new scheme, but that
this generally takes the form of redesigning their benefits to complement or top-up the
statutory scheme. No employer in the survey reports removing their paid leave provision
(Martin et al. 2014a). This suggests that the monotonicity assumption is reasonable.
5 Data
We use data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA)
Survey. Wave 1 of HILDA was collected in 2001 and surveyed 7,682 randomly selected
households containing 19,914 people. These respondents have been interviewed annually
since 2001, answering questions covering a broad range of demographic, economic and
social topics.8 Our estimation sample consists of employed women aged 21 to 45 who
answer a set of questions about their fertility intentions and their access to employer-
provided paid maternity leave.
8An extension sample was included from 2011 – we exclude these individuals from our analysis as this
is after the announcement and implementation of the PPL scheme.
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Fertility intentions are measured by responses to three questions. First, respondents
are asked “How do you feel about having a child/more children in the future?” on a
scale from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating higher certainty that more children are
wanted. We interpret this as a measure of fertility desires. Second, respondents are asked
to indicate how likely they are to have a child or more children in the future on a scale
from 0 to 10. This is our measure of fertility intentions.9 If the response to this second
question is 6 or higher, the respondent is then asked how many (more) children they intend
to have – the intended number of children. Our focus on the response to these questions
means that we exclude data from waves 5, 8 and 11 due to differences in the criteria used
to determine who is asked these questions making the responses non-comparable.10
A further critical response for our analysis is whether the woman is able to access paid
maternity leave from her employer. This question is part of a battery of questions about
employer-provided entitlements. From wave 2 onward, these questions ask whether “you,
or or other employees working at a similar level to you at your workplace” would be able
to use the entitlement if needed. In contrast, in wave 1 the question is limited to whether
the respondent would personally have access to the entitlement, and so wave 1 is excluded
from our analysis. Moreover, not all respondents report knowing whether they (or other
similar employees) have access to paid maternity leave: 17% of respondents report that
they don’t know.11 For our main analysis, we exclude these ‘don’t know’ responses, and
in section 6.3 we provide robustness checks including these ‘don’t know’ responses under
various assumptions.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the analysis sample, in aggregate and split
into those working in the public or private sector. After excluding observations with
missing data, we have 13366 observations for 4339 individuals. Public sector workers in
the sample are on average slightly older, more educated, have higher incomes, and have
more children than their private sector counterparts. Controlling for these characteristics
9Whilst some research distinguishes between fertility expectations and intentions, they are generally
empirically equivalent in practice (Iacovou and Tavares 2011).
10In waves 5, 8 and 11 a rotating module on ‘fertility and family’ appeared in the HILDA survey,
including the fertility intention questions. Before this rotating module, respondents were warned that the
questions were personal and they were free to refuse to answer at any time. Consequently there are more
refusals in these waves. Additionally, the fertility intention questions were only asked to respondents who
reported that they and their partner had not been sterilized. By excluding women who are sterilized,
those women who do answer have disproportionately high fertility desires and intentions compared with
other waves. The number of children question is asked to all non-sterilized respondents in waves 5, 8 and
11, instead of being restricted to those answering 6 or higher to the fertility intentions question, and so
these responses are also not comparable across waves.
11Survey data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) have a similar proportion of ‘don’t know’
responses (16% in 2007), and ABS analysis suggests that these responses are not disproportionately found
across a range of demographic and labour market characteristics (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2008).
It is therefore suggested that the ‘don’t know’ responses can be inferred to have a similar distribution to
those who responded yes or no to the question (Productivity Commission 2009).
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Table 1: Summary statisitics
All women Private sector Public sector
Age 33.31 32.87 34.29
(7.08) (7.11) (6.91)
Number of children 1.16 1.15 1.18
(1.28) (1.28) (1.27)
Education
Bachelor degree or higher 0.40 0.31 0.59
(0.49) (0.46) (0.49)
Further education 0.27 0.29 0.21
(0.44) (0.46) (0.40)
Year 12 0.18 0.21 0.12
(0.38) (0.41) (0.33)
Year 11 or lower 0.16 0.19 0.09
(0.36) (0.39) (0.28)
Marital status
Married 0.50 0.50 0.52
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
De facto 0.22 0.22 0.22
(0.41) (0.41) (0.41)
Separated/Divorced/Widowed 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.25) (0.25) (0.26)
Never married 0.21 0.22 0.19
(0.41) (0.41) (0.39)
Country of birth
Australia 0.84 0.83 0.86
(0.37) (0.38) (0.35)
Other English speaking 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.25) (0.26) (0.25)
Other non-English speaking 0.09 0.10 0.07
(0.29) (0.30) (0.26)
Individual income ($000) 51.50 48.82 57.49
(43.53) (45.15) (39.01)
Household income ($000) 122.03 119.61 127.45
(89.06) (93.20) (78.76)
Employer paid maternity leave 0.53 0.39 0.84
(0.50) (0.49) (0.37)
Fertility intentions
Fertility desires (1-10 scale) 4.79 4.86 4.62
(4.28) (4.29) (4.26)
Fertility intentions (1-10 scale) 4.14 4.23 3.92
(4.14) (4.16) (4.08)
Additional number intended 2.11 2.12 2.07
(0.84) (0.85) (0.81)
Observations 13366 9241 4125
Individuals 4339 3473 1460
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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in our analysis is crucial as age, education and changes in fertility and relationship status
are important determinants of fertility desires and intentions (Hagewen and Morgan 2005;
Liefbroer 2009; Iacovou and Tavares 2011; Gray et al. 2013).
Our sample gives estimates of coverage that are broadly in line with estimates from
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) survey data: estimates reported in the Productiv-
ity Commission’s Inquiry Report suggest that paid maternity leave was available to 41%
of working women in 2002, 44% in 2004 and 54% in 2007; our comparable estimates are
42%, 48% and 54% (Productivity Commission 2009). Figure 1 illustrates these trends in
access to employer-provided paid maternity leave by employment sector. Public sector
workers are around twice as likely to have access to paid maternity leave than private
sector workers. This difference is persistent over time, though there is an upward trend
in provision, particularly in the lead up to the PPL scheme’s announcement. Figure 2
illustrates the trends in access to any paid leave, incorporating paid leave provided by the
statutory scheme from the time of its announcement. The figure therefore shows antici-
pated access to leave, which we expect to drive changes in fertility desires and intentions.
The divergence in trends in this anticipated access at the scheme’s announcement, with
the large increase in paid parental leave access for women working in the private sector,
illustrates the variation we use to identify the impact of paid parental leave on fertility
intentions.
Figure 1: Access to employer-provided paid parental leave, by sector of employment
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Figure 2: Anticipated access to any paid parental leave, by sector of employment
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6 Results
Results from the OLS and instrumental variables specifications for our main sample are
shown in tables 2 to 4. In all three tables, all columns show results from specifications
including a full set of year and state of residence indicators, alongside demographic char-
acteristics including age and its square, education, aboriginal status, country of birth and
marital status indicators. Columns 2 and 5 add the number of children a woman already
has and its square, and an indicator for having no children. Individual and household
incomes, and a full set of industry indicators are included in columns 3 and 6.
Table 2 presents results for fertility desires. Column 1 suggests that women with access
to paid parental leave report a higher desire for children on average – an increase of 0.35
on the 0-10 scale (from an average of 4.8), controlling for time trends, age, education and
marital status. However, this correlation is mainly explained by the number of children a
woman already has, as demonstrated by the much smaller and statistically insignificant
coefficients in columns 2 and 3. This may reflect the sorting of women who are yet to
have children (and so have higher fertility intentions) into jobs that provide paid maternity
leave. The IV results in columns 4 to 6 find no evidence of a significant impact of paid
leave access on fertility desires. Results for fertility intentions, shown in table 3 show a
similar pattern: the observed correlation between paid leave access and fertility intentions
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Table 2: Effect of paid parental leave access on fertility desires
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Access to leave 0.346∗∗∗ 0.125 0.088 0.603 0.386 0.420
(0.094) (0.087) (0.088) (0.352) (0.320) (0.319)
Age 0.094 0.180∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.091 0.176∗∗ 0.174∗∗
(0.059) (0.055) (0.056) (0.059) (0.055) (0.055)
Age2 -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education (reference group: less than Year 12)
Bachelors or higher 1.403∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗ 1.404∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.134) (0.145) (0.149) (0.140) (0.146)
Further education 0.600∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗ 0.294∗ 0.597∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗ 0.287∗
(0.144) (0.129) (0.131) (0.144) (0.130) (0.131)
Completed Year 12 0.809∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.144) (0.144) (0.160) (0.144) (0.144)
Marital status (reference group: married)
De Facto 0.841∗∗∗ -0.116 -0.098 0.839∗∗∗ -0.112 -0.093
(0.120) (0.121) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120)
Separated/Widowed -0.473∗∗ -0.678∗∗∗ -0.653∗∗∗ -0.476∗∗ -0.681∗∗∗ -0.655∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.148) (0.155) (0.158) (0.148) (0.154)
Never married 0.385∗∗ -0.913∗∗∗ -0.870∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗ -0.912∗∗∗ -0.871∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.133) (0.134) (0.135) (0.133) (0.133)
No. of children -2.826∗∗∗ -2.828∗∗∗ -2.825∗∗∗ -2.828∗∗∗
(0.341) (0.342) (0.342) (0.342)
No. of children2 0.331∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Childless -1.346∗∗∗ -1.377∗∗∗ -1.362∗∗∗ -1.393∗∗∗
(0.381) (0.381) (0.381) (0.382)
Year fixed effects 4 4 4 4 4 4
State fixed effects 4 4 4 4 4 4
Income measures 4 4
Industry indicators 4 4
Observations 13366 13366 13366 13366 13366 13366
Individuals 4339 4339 4339 4339 4339 4339
First stage F-statistic 846.371 830.801 838.845
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Indicators for country of birth and Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander status included
Income measures: personal income, household income and their squares.
Industry indicators: set of 19 indicators for ANZSIC 2006 Division codes.
14
Table 3: Effect of paid parental leave access on fertility intentions
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Access to leave 0.202∗ -0.006 -0.056 0.484 0.272 0.296
(0.082) (0.075) (0.076) (0.321) (0.290) (0.289)
Age -0.209∗∗∗ -0.116∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.120∗ -0.134∗∗
(0.054) (0.050) (0.051) (0.054) (0.050) (0.051)
Age2 -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education (reference group: less than Year 12)
Bachelors or higher 1.351∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 1.346∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.111) (0.121) (0.124) (0.116) (0.121)
Further education 0.579∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗ 0.282∗ 0.573∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗ 0.275∗
(0.121) (0.110) (0.112) (0.121) (0.111) (0.112)
Completed Year 12 0.768∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.762∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.124) (0.124) (0.137) (0.124) (0.124)
Marital status (reference group: married)
De Facto 0.785∗∗∗ -0.125 -0.115 0.783∗∗∗ -0.122 -0.110
(0.108) (0.110) (0.109) (0.108) (0.109) (0.109)
Separated/Widowed -0.549∗∗∗ -0.738∗∗∗ -0.738∗∗∗ -0.553∗∗∗ -0.742∗∗∗ -0.739∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.112) (0.120) (0.115) (0.112) (0.120)
Never married -0.107 -1.343∗∗∗ -1.312∗∗∗ -0.115 -1.342∗∗∗ -1.313∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.118) (0.118) (0.117) (0.117) (0.118)
No. of children -2.548∗∗∗ -2.543∗∗∗ -2.548∗∗∗ -2.543∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.318) (0.319) (0.318)
No. of children2 0.309∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Childless -0.990∗∗ -1.030∗∗ -1.007∗∗ -1.046∗∗
(0.351) (0.351) (0.352) (0.351)
Year fixed effects 4 4 4 4 4 4
State fixed effects 4 4 4 4 4 4
Income measures 4 4
Industry indicators 4 4
Observations 13366 13366 13366 13366 13366 13366
Individuals 4339 4339 4339 4339 4339 4339
First stage F-statistic 846.371 830.801 838.845
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Indicators for country of birth and Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander status included
Income measures: personal income, household income and their squares.
Industry indicators: set of 19 indicators for ANZSIC 2006 Division codes.
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is entirely explained by the number of existing children a woman has, again suggesting
that women select into jobs offering paid maternity leave on the basis of their fertility
intentions. IV results in columns 4 to 6 are again statistically insignificant, suggesting
that access to paid parental leave has no effect on women’s fertility intentions at the
extensive margin.
Table 4 gives results for our third outcome: the intended number of children (condi-
tional on a high fertility intention). Once the existing number of children is controlled
for, women with access to paid leave do not intend to have more children on average
than women without leave. However, the instrumental variables results in columns 4 to
6 reveal a different result: exploiting the fact that the statutory PPL scheme had a much
larger impact on paid leave access for women working in the private sector than those
working in the public sector we see that having access to paid parental leave increases the
intended number of children by 0.28, even after controlling for the number of existing chil-
dren, income and industry. This is a 13% increase relative to the sample average intended
number of children. This implies that access to paid leave increases fertility intentions at
the intensive margin.
The validity of the IV results depends on the assumptions discussed above. The first
stage of the IV regressions allows us to test whether our instrument is strong. Tables 2 to
4 report first stage F-statistics for these regressions ranging from 351 to 846, indicating a
strong instrument. The full first-stage regressions are reported in table 5. Columns 1 to
3 give the first stage regressions corresponding to columns 4 to 6 of tables 2 and 3, whilst
columns 4 to 6 correspond to table 4. These estimates show that being in the private sector
after the announcement of the PPL scheme is linked to a highly statistically significant 42
percentage point increase in the likelihood of access to any paid leave, consistent across all
specifications. This extremely strong first stage response is illustrated in figure 2, showing
the strong convergence of paid leave access across the private and public sectors. Table 5
further shows that employment sector is one of the only strong predictors of access to paid
leave in the sample. There is little variation by education or marital status, with some
evidence of women without children being more likely to have access to paid parental
leave.
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Table 4: Effect of paid parental leave access on intended number of children
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Access to leave 0.111∗∗∗ 0.048 0.046 0.377∗∗ 0.292∗ 0.283∗
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.129) (0.121) (0.120)
Age 0.011 0.020 0.032 0.001 0.011 0.027
(0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026)
Age2 -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.001∗ -0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education (reference group: less than Year 12)
Bachelors or higher 0.294∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.046) (0.049) (0.051) (0.049) (0.050)
Further education 0.183∗∗∗ 0.110∗ 0.108∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.112∗ 0.111∗
(0.054) (0.050) (0.049) (0.055) (0.051) (0.050)
Completed Year 12 0.274∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.051) (0.050) (0.056) (0.052) (0.051)
Marital status (reference group: married)
De Facto 0.098∗∗ -0.065∗ -0.063 0.095∗∗ -0.063∗ -0.061
(0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032)
Separated/widowed 0.072 -0.006 0.011 0.057 -0.019 0.000
(0.078) (0.075) (0.078) (0.081) (0.078) (0.080)
Never married 0.265∗∗∗ 0.059 0.055 0.258∗∗∗ 0.059 0.053
(0.043) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042)
No. of children -0.154∗∗ -0.162∗∗ -0.158∗∗ -0.169∗∗
(0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056)
No. of children2 0.024∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.026∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Childless 0.581∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062)
Year fixed effects 4 4 4 4 4 4
State fixed effects 4 4 4 4 4 4
Income measures 4 4
Industry indicators 4 4
Observations 5312 5312 5312 5312 5312 5312
Individuals 2293 2293 2293 2293 2293 2293
First stage F-statistic 359.319 350.967 361.989
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Indicators for country of birth and Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander status included
Income measures: personal income, household income and their squares.
Industry indicators: set of 19 indicators for ANZSIC 2006 Division codes.
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Table 5: First stage. Dependent variable: (anticipated) access to any paid parental leave
Full sample Intended number sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private sector*post 0.427∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Private sector -0.456∗∗∗ -0.454∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗ -0.434∗∗∗ -0.432∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
Age 0.011 0.015∗ 0.008 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.024
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Age2 -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000 -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education (reference group: less than Year 12)
Bachelors or higher 0.072∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.023 0.041 0.024 -0.015
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Further education 0.026 0.019 0.004 0.002 -0.008 -0.025
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Completed Year 12 0.026 0.019 0.004 0.003 -0.005 -0.023
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
Marital status (reference group: married)
De Facto 0.010 -0.013 -0.008 0.013 -0.006 -0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Separated/widowed 0.014 0.011 -0.000 0.070 0.064 0.052
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.049) (0.048) (0.050)
Never married 0.030∗ -0.002 0.007 0.024 -0.000 0.013
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
No. of children -0.005 0.002 -0.013 -0.002
(0.014) (0.014) (0.031) (0.030)
No. of children2 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Childless 0.051∗ 0.046∗ 0.059 0.044
(0.020) (0.020) (0.034) (0.034)
Year fixed effects 4 4 4 4 4 4
State fixed effects 4 4 4 4 4 4
Income measures 4 4
Industry indicators 4 4
Observations 13366 13366 13366 5312 5312 5312
Individuals 4339 4339 4339 2293 2293 2293
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Indicators for country of birth and Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander status included
Income measures: personal income, household income and their squares.
Industry indicators: set of 19 indicators for ANZSIC 2006 Division codes.
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6.1 Estimates around the scheme’s implementation
Results presented so far have focused on the impact of the PPL scheme’s announcement
on anticipated leave access and on to fertility desires and intentions. We may also see
a response in intentions after the scheme’s implementation in 2011. Table 6 reports IV
results analogous to those in tables 2 to 4 considering contemporaneous access to any
paid leave instead of anticipated access caused by the scheme’s announcement. There is
a reduction in instrument strength in these results, and generally a reduction in the point
estimates. Panel A shows that there are no statistically significant effects on fertility
desires or intentions, consistent with the main results presented above. The coefficients
for estimates of the effect of paid leave access on the intended number of children reported
in Panel B are in line with those in table 4, but do not reach statistical significance. This
reinforces the magnitude of the effect found above, and supports the announcement of
the statutory scheme as the relevant time for the scheme’s impact on fertility intentions.
Table 6: Implementation effects
IV estimates
(1) (2) (3)
A: Fertility desires and intentions
Fertility desires 0.712 0.276 0.343
(0.544) (0.498) (0.497)
Fertility intentions 0.219 -0.210 -0.159
(0.505) (0.465) (0.464)
Observations 13366 13366 13366
Individuals 4339 4339 4339
First stage F-statistic 576.217 557.137 550.494
B: Intended number of children
Intended number of children 0.484∗ 0.313 0.286
(0.206) (0.195) (0.195)
Observations 5312 5312 5312
Individuals 2293 2293 2293
First stage F-statistic 234.976 221.149 220.133
Year fixed effects 4 4 4
State fixed effects 4 4 4
Age, education 4 4 4
Marital status 4 4 4
Existing children 4 4
Income measures 4
Industry indicators 4
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Other regressors: country of birth, Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander status.
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6.2 Heterogeneity across groups
The results described above pool the complete sample of working women aged 21 to 45.
Tables 7 and 8 split the sample by the presence of children and education level to gain
further insight into which groups are driving the effects of paid parental leave access on
the intensive margin of fertility intentions.
Table 7 divides the sample into observations where women have had at least one child
and those who are yet to have a child and presents IV results with the full set of control
variables for our three outcomes. For each outcome, the magnitude of the estimated effect
of access to paid parental leave is substantially higher for women with no children. In
particular, for the intended number of children the estimated effect of paid leave access
is only significant for women without children, where access causes an increase in the
intended number of children of 0.34, a 15% increase for the group.
Table 8 splits the women into groups based on education. The first line presents IV
results for our three outcomes with the full set of controls for women with Year 12 edu-
cation or less.12 None of the IV estimates are statistically significant in this subsample.
In contrast, the second part of table 8 shows estimates for women with education be-
yond Year 12, and shows that the effect of paid leave access on the intensive margin of
fertility intentions occurs among these more highly educated women. Women without
children are more likely to be in this more highly educated, career-oriented group even
after conditioning on age and marital status.
Table 7: Results by presence of children
Desires Intentions Intended number
One or more children 0.128 0.023 0.045
(0.430) (0.363) (0.194)
Observations 7277 7277 1157
Individuals 2455 2455 747
First stage F-statistic 457.429 457.429 97.318
No children 0.654 0.607 0.340∗
(0.467) (0.443) (0.142)
Observations 6089 6089 4155
Individuals 2393 2393 1906
First stage F-statistic 388.935 388.935 269.918
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Regressors as in column 3 of tables 2-5
12This is roughly equivalent to the sample of high school graduates and drop outs.
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Table 8: Results by education level
Desires Intentions Intended number
Year 12 or less 0.888 0.843 0.091
(0.704) (0.667) (0.281)
Observations 4503 4503 1536
Individuals 1779 1779 815
First stage F-statistic 169.079 169.079 72.924
Beyond Year 12 0.288 0.254 0.334∗
(0.377) (0.336) (0.140)
Observations 8863 8863 3776
Individuals 2826 2826 1613
First stage F-statistic 588.078 588.078 264.394
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Regressors as in column 3 of tables 2-5
6.3 Including women uncertain about leave availability
Our main results presented above exclude observations where women respond ‘don’t know’
when asked whether they, or others in their position at their employer, have access to
paid maternity leave. This allows us to infer the impact of the PPL scheme on leave
access. However, if women who do not know whether they have access to paid leave have
systematically different fertility desires and intentions compared to women who know
their leave status then our results will be biased. For example, women who do not want
or intend to have children may not be aware of their eligibility for paid maternity leave
and other family-friendly workplace benefits, and their fertility intentions are unlikely to
respond to the availability of paid leave. If these unaware and uninterested women are
concentrated in the private sector and do not have access to paid maternity leave, we
may underestimate the impact of the PPL scheme’s announcement on leave access in the
private sector and at the same time overestimate the responsiveness of fertility intentions.
This will lead our IV estimates of the impact of paid leave access to be biased upwards.
To test whether our results are robust to including women who answer ‘don’t know’
when asked about paid maternity leave, we include them under two scenarios. First,
we assume that all women answering ‘don’t know’ do in fact have access to paid mater-
nity leave, minimising the impact of the statutory PPL scheme. We then assume that
these women don’t have access to leave. Estimates of our main results under these two
assumptions then provide estimates reflecting two extremes of measurement error.
Table 9 reports these results. For all three outcomes the two extreme assumptions
generate estimates that bound the point estimates of our main results. The significant
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impact of access to leave on the intensive margin of fertility intentions is retained under
both assumptions: access to paid parental leave increases the intended number of children
by between 0.26 and 0.39, compared to our main estimate of 0.28.
Table 9: Including women who answer ‘don’t know’
Desires Intentions Intended number
Don’t know = yes 0.561 0.352 0.386∗
(0.406) (0.365) (0.162)
First stage F-statistic 580.242 580.242 235.221
Don’t know = no 0.393 0.246 0.261∗
(0.284) (0.255) (0.109)
First stage F-statistic 1064.910 1064.910 502.640
Observations 16194 16194 6396
Individuals 4804 4804 2567
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Regressors as in column 3 of tables 2-5
6.4 Placebo tests
The validity of the results presented in this section relies upon there being no differences
in pre-existing trends in either access to paid maternity leave or fertility intentions and
desires. Since our sample spans 2002-2013, we can use the pre-announcement data to
perform placebo tests – in effect, to test whether there is any difference in these outcomes
between public and private sector workers in the years prior to the 2009 announcement.
Tables 10 and 11, and figures 3 and 4 show results from these tests.
Table 10 presents selected coefficients from the baseline first-stage regression (column
1) and from the placebo test regression (column 2). In the placebo test, a series of addi-
tional regressors are added beyond the selected instrument (the interaction of being in the
private sector after the PPL scheme announcement). These additional regressors interact
the private sector indicator with wave indicators for each wave prior to the announce-
ment.13 If there are pre-existing differences in the trends of paid maternity leave access
prior to the scheme’s announcement, estimated coefficients on these additional regressors
will be significantly different from zero.
13Excluding the interaction with wave 2 to avoid collinearity.
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Table 10: Reduced form and placebo test – first stage
(1) (2)
Baseline Placebo test
Private sector*post 0.424∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.024)
Private sector*wave 3 -0.036
(0.027)
Private sector*wave 4 -0.041
(0.029)
Private sector*wave 6 -0.049
(0.030)
Private sector*wave 7 -0.007
(0.031)
Observations 13366 13366
Individuals 4339 4339
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Regressors as in column 3 of tables 2-5
Figure 3: Placebo test illustration: first stage
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Table 10 shows that this is not the case: we cannot reject the hypothesis that trends
in anticipated paid maternity leave access were common for public and private sector
workers prior to the PPL scheme’s announcement. These coefficients are illustrated in
figure 3, demonstrating the clear differential impact of the announcement of the PPL
scheme on leave access and no difference in trends in the prior period.
To perform similar placebo tests for fertility desires and intentions, we perform reduced
form regressions.14 These directly estimate the effect of being in the private sector after
the announcement of the PPL scheme on fertility desires and intentions. This approach
allows us to add the same ‘placebo’ regressors as in the first stage placebo test above.
Again, if any of these placebo regressor coefficients is statistically significant, this indi-
cates differences in the trends of the fertility outcome in the period before the scheme’s
announcement, and so would cast doubt on the estimates presented above.
Table 11 presents regression results, both for baseline reduced-form regressions and the
full placebo tests. None of the placebo regressor coefficients are statistically significant,
and the reduced form estimates of the effect of paid parental leave access on fertility desires
and intentions are insignificantly different from zero, consistent with the IV estimates
above. For the intended number of children (the intensive margin of fertility intentions),
the statistically significant effect persists when the placebo regressors are introduced and
none of the placebo coefficients are statistically significant. This provides some confidence
that the significant impact of paid parental leave access on the intended number of children
is identified by exogenous variation in paid leave access driven by the PPL scheme’s
differential impact on workers in the public and private sectors. Figure 4 illustrates the
reduced form coefficients from the placebo test.
6.5 Sector switching and participation decisions
A further threat to these estimates is that they could be driven by women changing their
sector of work, or entering or leaving the labour market, in response to the PPL scheme’s
announcement. For example, if public sector workers with high fertility preferences move
to private sector jobs in response to the PPL scheme’s introduction, this would increase
fertility intentions in the private sector and reduce fertility intentions in the public sector
resulting in a positive estimated effect of paid parental leave access under our empirical
strategy that does not reflect a true increase in fertility intentions. Similarly, if the PPL
scheme causes higher fertility preference non-working women to enter the labour force
and disproportionately choose private sector jobs, the same problem may arise. As our
14That is, we estimate the following: prefit = β0 +β1prisec∗post+β3Xit +εit. β1 is the reduced form
coefficient.
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Table 11: Reduced form and placebo tests
Desires Intentions Intended number
Baseline Placebo Baseline Placebo Baseline Placebo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private sector*post 0.178 0.360 0.126 0.191 0.118∗ 0.184∗
(0.135) (0.192) (0.123) (0.169) (0.050) (0.078)
Private sector*wave 3 0.087 -0.047 0.086
(0.174) (0.157) (0.081)
Private sector*wave 4 0.080 -0.091 0.093
(0.199) (0.174) (0.094)
Private sector*wave 6 0.386 0.288 0.051
(0.212) (0.185) (0.096)
Private sector*wave 7 0.364 0.162 0.098
(0.219) (0.195) (0.092)
Observations 13366 13366 13366 13366 5312 5312
Individuals 4339 4339 4339 4339 2293 2293
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Regressors as in column 3 of tables 2-5
Figure 4: Placebo test illustration: intended number
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data are drawn from a panel, we can evaluate whether such mechanisms contribute to our
results.
We perform a series of tests of whether women’s stated fertility desires and intentions
in 2007 (the last wave of data before the PPL scheme’s announcement) are correlated
with the propensity to change sectors or to enter or exit the labour force. We distinguish
between ‘sector leavers’ and ‘sector joiners’ for each sector, including women who either
join or leave the labour force. For a given sector, we test whether future sector leavers and
joiners have significantly different fertility desires and intentions in 2007 relative to those
remaining in the same sector. Any significant differences would indicate the possibility of
bias in the results presented above as the average fertility preferences in the two sectors
would have changed due to the leavers and joiners.
Table 12 presents results for these tests. We consider a woman a sector leaver if she
is ever observed not working in that sector in the post-announcement waves (either not
working, or working in the other sector). Comparably, a woman is a sector joiner if she
does not work in the sector in 2007 (pre-announcement), but is ever observed working
in that sector after the scheme’s announcement.15 For each of our outcome variables, we
estimate whether there is a difference between average fertility preferences in the original
group and the group of leavers or joiners. Any significant difference would indicate that
the leavers and joiners changed average fertility intentions in the sector, contaminating
the above results.16
These results indicate that private sector workers who either leave the labour force, or
switch to a public sector job have higher fertility desires and (extensive margin) intentions
than private sector workers who remain. So, the workers leaving the sector will, other
things being equal, reduce average fertility desires and intentions in the private sector.
With no other significant differences in sector leavers and joiners for these outcomes, this
suggests that the estimate of no impact of paid parental leave access on these outcomes
reported above is a lower bound for this impact: if all workers stayed in the sector, these
reported preferences would be higher.
For the intended number of children, we see no significant difference in the average
conditional-on-positive number for workers leaving or joining either the public or private
sector. This supports the interpretation of the above estimate as the causal impact of
access to paid parental leave on the number of children a woman intends to have.
15We reach the same conclusions if we instead consider the proportion of observations the woman is
observed to be a sector leaver or joiner.
16We consider fertility intentions in wave 7 as any changes after the announcement of the PPL scheme
could be driven by the scheme’s announcement. For example, women entering the labour market and
taking a private sector job in 2010 could have higher fertility intentions than existing private sector
workers and these higher intentions could have been caused by the scheme’s introduction.
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Table 12: Tests for difference in fertility preferences of sector leavers and joiners
(1) (2) (3)
Desires Intentions Intended no.
Sector leavers
Private sector 0.590∗ 0.705∗∗ -0.038
(0.291) (0.271) (0.095)
Observations 1056 1056 474
Public sector 0.361 0.433 0.088
(0.365) (0.325) (0.139)
Observations 384 384 165
Sector joiners
Private sector 0.135 0.371 -0.016
(0.206) (0.193) (0.080)
Observations 1372 1372 600
Public sector 0.183 0.156 -0.155
(0.347) (0.309) (0.128)
Observations 501 501 211
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
All observations from wave 7 only, with sector joiners and leavers
determined by subsequent observations
Controls: state indicators, age, age squared, education indicators,
marital status indicators, country of birth indicators, Aboriginal/
Torres Strait Islander status, number of children, number of
children squared, no children indicator.
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7 Conclusion
The existing body of research on the fertility impact of paid parental leave largely examines
national policy changes in countries with existing, generous paid leave schemes (Lalive and
Zweimu¨ller 2009; Malkova 2014; Raute 2014; Stichnoth 2014). In this paper, we consider
the introduction of a relatively modest paid leave scheme and examine its impact on
fertility desires and intentions. We exploit the fact that the scheme’s introduction had a
large impact on paid parental leave access for women working in the private sector, but
comparatively little effect on having any leave access for public sector workers to identify
plausibly exogenous variation in paid leave access. We find that access to any paid parental
leave has no significant effect on fertility desires or expectations at the extensive margin.
Conditional on expecting to have at least one more child, access to paid leave increases
the number intended by 0.28, a 13% increase. These results are not driven by changes in
employment status or sector in response to the scheme’s announcement.
This result is driven by the fertility intentions of more highly educated women and
those who do not yet have children. These women are more likely to be concerned with
combining work and childbearing. Moreover, this is a local average treatment effect: it
is the effect of access to any paid leave for working women who gained access as a result
of being in the private sector after the scheme’s announcement. That is, it is the average
effect among women working in the private sector who did not have employer-provided
paid parental leave. This is an estimate of particular interest if we wish to consider the
introduction of such a scheme in an alternative setting.
Whilst stated fertility intentions and desires are not perfect predictors of fertility rates
(Morgan 2001), a large body of research shows that fertility intentions are an informative
signal of eventual fertility beyond observable characteristics (Schoen et al. 1999; Berring-
ton 2004). Accordingly, we expect that increased intentions will be followed by an increase
in realized fertility in the future. Thus, despite not being intended as a pronatalist policy,
the PPL scheme may lead to increased fertility. Since Australia’s birth rate is currently
below replacement at 1.9 (OECD 2015a), this can be interpreted as an added bonus rather
than an unwanted side effect of the program.17
In an international context, these results demonstrate the potential for even modest
paid parental leave schemes to have fertility impacts. With discussions about a possible
federal scheme in the United States, both through local initiatives encouraged by the
Department of Labor (United States Department of Labor 2015) and policy positions in
the 2016 US Presidential campaign (Peck 2016), understanding the potential impacts of
17Indeed, when a more generous variation of the PPL scheme was proposed by the Australian govern-
ment in 2013, then-leader Tony Abbott expressed hope it would lead to a baby boom (Griffiths 2013).
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this modest PPL scheme provides important evidence for the design and potential benefits
of a similar scheme elsewhere.
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